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CDA 230 FOR A SMART INTERNET
Madeline Byrd* & Katherine J. Strandburg**
INTRODUCTION
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 19961 (“CDA 230”),
which provides broad-based immunity to online service providers for thirdparty content, has been hailed as “the law that gave us the modern internet.”2
Indeed some have gone so far as to suggest that it is responsible for more
value creation than any other law in U.S. history.3 The breadth of its
application has come under increasing fire, however, from critics who
contend that it has turned the internet into a lawless realm that is inundated
with false and misleading information and often hostile to women and
minorities.4
* J.D., 2019, New York University School of Law.
** Alfred B. Engelberg Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Information Law
Institute, New York University School of Law. Professor Strandburg is grateful for summer
research funding from the Filomen D. Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund. This
Article was prepared for the Symposium entitled Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence,
Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the
Neuroscience and Law Center on February 15, 2019, at Fordham University School of Law.
For an overview of the Symposium, see Deborah W. Denno & Ryan Surujnath, Foreword:
Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 381 (2019).
1. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Derek Khanna, The Law That Gave Us the Modern Internet—and the
Campaign to Kill It, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2013/09/the-law-that-gave-us-the-modern-internet-and-the-campaign-to-killit/279588 [https://perma.cc/3FNB-2UJ3].
3. David Post, A Bit of Internet History, or How Two Members of Congress Helped
Create a Trillion or so Dollars of Value, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/27/a-bit-of-internethistory-or-how-two-members-of-congress-helped-create-a-trillion-or-so-dollars-of-value
[https://perma.cc/HP54-S9M3].
4. For critiques of CDA 230 and proposals for reform, see, for example, Danielle Keats
Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity,
2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453 (2018) and Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet
Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404–
06 (2017) [hereinafter Internet Will Not Break] and Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler,
From the Digital to the Physical: Federal Limitations on Regulating Online Marketplaces,
56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 142, 142 (2019) (arguing that the CDA “has been stretched beyond
recognition to prevent all manner of prudent regulation” and proposing a variety of possible
approaches to reform). For an excellent, sympathetic overview of the provision, see Eric
Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3306737 [https://perma.cc/UWH7-6PHE].
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This Article analyzes CDA 230 liability in light of the evolution of smart
services employing data-driven personalized models of user behavior. As an
illustrative case study, we discuss discrimination claims against Facebook’s
ad-targeting platform, relying on recent empirical studies5 and litigation
documents for factual background.6
We argue that current controversies about CDA 230’s scope are best
analyzed within a larger context of debates about secondary liability regimes.
Viewing CDA 230 through this lens, we propose reforms that account for the
growing predominance of smart services and provide pathways for dealing
with other areas of concern.
Part I provides background on CDA 230, taxonomizing the primary strains
of the case law in a secondary liability frame. Part II describes aspects of
Facebook’s ad-targeting platform that are salient for our analysis. Part III
outlines the basics of discriminatory advertising law under the Fair Housing
Act7 (FHA) and considers potential liability for two types of audience
selection tools. Part IV analyzes CDA 230’s applicability to those audience
selection tools. Part V analyzes CDA 230 from a secondary liability
perspective. This Article concludes with proposals for modifying CDA 230
in light of the preceding analysis.
I. CDA 230 IMMUNITY: HOPES AND STRUGGLES
Section 230(c) of the CDA, entitled “Protection for Good Samaritan
Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material,” grants providers and users
of “interactive computer services” sweeping exemption from liability for
actionable content created or published by others.8 Its central provision
states: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”9 This Part briefly reviews CDA 230’s history
and judicial interpretation and explains how the evolution of the doctrine
touches upon themes common to secondary liability regimes.

5. See Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s
Ad Delivery Can Lead to Skewed Outcomes (Sept. 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.02095.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L47-YLA8]; see also Amit Datta et
al., Discrimination in Online Advertising: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 81 PROC. MACHINE
LEARNING RES. 20 (2018); Till Speicher et al., Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted
Advertising, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 5 (2018).
6. See generally Settlement Agreement and Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook,
Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019), ECF No. 67-2 [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement]; Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Nat’l Fair Hous. All., No.
1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018), ECF No. 48 [hereinafter HUD Brief].
7. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
9. Id.
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A. CDA 230’s History and Purpose
Congress enacted CDA 230 in 1996, during the early years of the internet’s
transformation into a hub of commercial and social activity. Its enactment
responded to a judicial ruling that Prodigy, which hosted a large set of online
“bulletin boards,” could be liable as the “publisher” of defamatory user
postings.10 As evidence that Prodigy was a publisher, rather than merely a
distributor, of user postings, the ruling relied heavily on Prodigy’s
employment of content moderators, promulgation of content guidelines, and
use of software to filter out offensive language.11
Congress, as explained in the statutory “Findings” and “Policy,”12 was
concerned about the downstream effects of holding service providers liable
for users’ defamation simply because they attempted to screen out
unwelcome content.13 Traditional publisher-style screening for actionable
content would have been untenable for online services that provided forums
for user-driven exchanges involving large amounts of rapidly changing
content.14 Congress also anticipated that, if relieved of liability, online
service providers would develop innovative technological “fixes” to the
content-screening problem.15 Given these assumptions, the benefits of
publisher liability seemed far outweighed by the costs.
Today, the hope that automated filtering technology could effectively
screen user content for actionable defamation, harassment, and the like seems
naive. CDA 230’s drafters also seem to have vastly underestimated the harm
side of the equation and undoubtedly would have been horrified by the
tsunami of racist, sexist, homophobic, fraudulent, untruthful, and otherwise
hurtful discourse that has accompanied the internet’s benefits.
The evolution from hands-off user forums to smart services has led to an
interesting jujitsu. While Congress originally feared that online service
providers would respond to liability risk by giving up trying to filter out
“objectionable” content, proponents of strong CDA 230 immunity now fear
that service providers will engage in overly cautious “collateral

10. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, tit. V, § 230, 110 Stat. 133, 137; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194
(1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule StrattonOakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and
users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted
access to objectionable material.”).
11. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (2012).
13. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 86.
14. Internet Will Not Break, supra note 4, at 404–06 (discussing the background to CDA
230 and noting Prodigy’s argument that “it could not possibly edit the thousands of daily
messages posted to its bulletin boards as a traditional publisher would”).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (listing policy objectives including “to encourage the development
of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received” and “to
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material”).

408

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

censorship.”16 Bolstering this fear, large online service providers have
responded to calls for regulation by constructing extensive regimens
combining filtering with human review, which raises freedom of expression
concerns.17
B. Judicial Interpretation and CDA 230’s Broad Sweep
CDA 230 immunizes any defendant who is “treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”18 Because CDA 230 does not define “publisher,” its interpretation
has been a central, and difficult, task for the courts. Plaintiffs initially
responded to CDA 230 defenses by arguing that the provision preserves
defamation doctrine’s distinction between “publishers,” who are held
responsible if they negligently publish defamatory content, and
“distributors,” who are liable only if they receive notice and do not act.19
Early cases rejected this distinction, however, immunizing service providers
against both “publisher” and “distributor” liability20 and giving them free
rein in handling requests to take down allegedly actionable content.21
These early cases were harbingers of broad judicial interpretation of
“publisher” under CDA 230. Many cases have tested the scope of
“publisher” activities, with results holding, for example, that CDA 230
immunizes decisions about what to post; nonsubstantive editing;
reformatting of fonts, colors, and the like; and re-presentation of information
in the form of star ratings or maps.22

16. See generally Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary
Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293 (2011); James Grimmelmann, To Err Is Platform,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/
err-platform [https://perma.cc/52C7-TJGL].
17. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1635 (2018).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). The reference to “speakers” is essentially redundant
and has played little role in CDA 230’s interpretation.
19. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49–50 (D.D.C. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52.
21. For a particularly expansive, and controversial, ruling that CDA 230 applies even to
takedown injunctions issued after users have been held liable, see generally Hassell v. Bird,
420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018).
22. See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1269–71
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding CDA immunity even where Google put the advertisements into a
map format); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding CDA
immunity even where Yelp! took reviews from a different website and added a star rating);
O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding CDA immunity even
where Google had performed some “automated editorial acts on the content, such as removing
spaces and altering font” and “kept the search result up even after [the plaintiff] complained
about it”); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“The CDA expressly bars ‘lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise
of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content.’” (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330)).
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Courts also have interpreted CDA 230’s substantive range of applicability
broadly,23 except in a few arenas where it was explicitly limited.24 While
scholars and policymakers have proposed removing CDA 230 protections
from additional substantive categories,25 only the recent Allow States and
Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 201726 (FOSTA) has been
enacted thus far.
Though refusing to recognize broad substantive exceptions to CDA 230’s
coverage, courts have sometimes declined to extend CDA 230 protection
because particular claims did not treat the defendant as a “publisher.” For
example, courts have denied immunity from claims of failure to provide
warnings required by state law,27 violations of federal robocalling
regulations,28 failure to follow regulations applicable to rental agents,29
failure to collect city amusement tax,30 and failure to post ads after accepting
payment.31 Consistent with this approach, courts have emphasized that CDA
230 does not provide blanket protection to a service provider who “plays

23. See, e.g., Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019) (state torts including
negligence, deceptive business practices and false advertising, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation); Chi.
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir.
2008) (Fair Housing Act); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(“material support” for terrorism); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D.
Va. 2003) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act); Hassell, 420 P.3d 776 (enforcement of a takedown
injunction); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. 2012) (unfair or deceptive trade
practices).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012) (limiting immunity for claims involving federal criminal
law, intellectual property law, and electronic surveillance law).
25. See, e.g., Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1320–21 (2017); Press Release,
Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., NAAG Supports Amendment to the Communications Decency
Act (May 23, 2019), https://www.naag.org/naag/media/naag-news/naag-supportsamendment-to-the-communications-decency-act.php
[https://perma.cc/728T-PLB6]
(suggesting an exception for state criminal violations); Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory
Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Apr. 1, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-data
[https://perma.cc/
8H5G-732C] (suggesting “an explicit exception to Section 230 immunity for violations of
civil rights laws”).
26. Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 47
U.S.C.).
27. See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850–52 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying
immunity in a failure to warn case where particular third parties used the defendant’s website
to target and lure rape victims).
28. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Montes, 378 F. Supp. 3d 741, 750 (W.D. Wis. 2019)
(denying immunity in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act claim based on robocalling).
29. See, e.g., HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676, 682–84 (9th
Cir. 2019) (denying immunity in a case involving rental regulations).
30. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting
that “Chicago’s amusement tax does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or is a
‘speaker’” and thus “Section 230(c) is irrelevant”).
31. See, e.g., O’Hara-Harmon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-00601 WHA, 2019 WL
1994087, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2019) (“Facebook would likely not be immunized from a
claim alleging it charged and collected money to publish advertising that it then did not
publish.”).
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multiple related but distinct roles in the online platform it has established.”32
For example, where Airbnb acted as both “a publisher of third-party rental
listings” and “an agent that books rental agreements between users and hosts
and collects and distributes payments,” it was not immune from regulations
“directed only at Airbnb’s conduct in the latter role.”33
Faced with the broad judicial interpretation of “publisher,” plaintiffs often
contend that a service provider is liable because it acted as an “information
content provider” in its own right. CDA 230 defines “information content
provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for
the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service.”34 Courts have routinely treated
service providers as potentially liable “information content providers” when
they or their employees independently created or developed actionable
content.35 At the other end of the spectrum, courts have generally granted
CDA 230 protection to defendants when plaintiffs alleged merely that a
provider knew that a service was being used for illegal purposes or profited
from a third party’s creation and publication of actionable content.36
In intermediate cases, the crux of the issue is whether various activities
amount to “development” of information content “in part.”37 Though CDA
230 doctrine has not drawn a bright line, it is useful to consider two lines of
argument which, foreshadowing our analysis in Part V, we can analogize to
separate threads of secondary liability.38 One argument, analogous to
“contributory liability,” contends that the design or structure of a service
contributes to the information content’s alleged illegality, thereby making the
provider partly responsible for its development.39 A second argument,
analogous to “inducement,” contends that a provider is partly responsible for
development when it actively encourages users to develop actionable
content.40 Courts have generally been unconvinced by inducement-type
32. HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 683–84; Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston, No. 18-12358LTS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74823, at *11–12 (D. Mass. May 3, 2019), appeal filed, No. 191561 (1st Cir. June 6, 2019); see also Airbnb, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 217
F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1072–73 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
33. Airbnb, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74823, at *11–12.
34. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012).
35. See, e.g., Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2016); FTC v. LeadClick
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th
Cir. 2009).
36. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir.
2007); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 727 (Wis. 2019).
37. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166–68 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
38. See infra Part V; see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (relating CDA 230 to contributory copyright
infringement).
39. See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670.
40. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (“The CDA does not grant immunity for
inducing third parties to express illegal preferences.”); see also Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421 (leaving
open the question of whether CDA 230 would immunize the “‘clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster’ unlawful activity that would be necessary to find active
inducement” (quoting MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005))).
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arguments. Disagreement about the implications of inducement seems to
underlie disparate decisions about whether Backpage.com could rely on
CDA 230 immunity with respect to claims involving its hosting of ads for
prostitution.41
Courts have more often held providers responsible for developing
actionable information based on the designs of their services. The Ninth
Circuit’s en banc decision in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley
v. Roommates.com, LLC42 is the seminal case in this regard. That decision
held that CDA 230 did not exempt Roommates.com from FHA liability when
its website “ma[de] answering the discriminatory questions a condition of
doing business” and its search system was designed to “steer users based on
the preferences and personal characteristics that Roommate.com itself forces
subscribers to disclose,” thus making it “more difficult or impossible for
individuals with certain protected characteristics to find housing—something
the law prohibits.”43 Roommates.com was, however, immune from liability
for allegations concerning posts that users entered into a box designed to
collect open-ended comments.44
The majority contrasted services designed as neutral tools that can be used
for both illegal and legal purposes with services that make material
contributions to the illegality.45 Thus, a standard search engine is a neutral
tool protected by CDA 230 even if its algorithm sometimes puts a defamatory
post at the top of search results.46 It is also not enough, under this test, to
show that a service could have been designed to be less amenable to
actionable use.47
As of this writing, we are unaware of any judicial opinion interpreting how
CDA 230 applies when “smart” algorithms play a role in the illegality
associated with online information content. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), however, has expressed its view in litigation
that CDA 230 does not immunize Facebook from liability for discriminatory
housing ad targeting, a question we analyze in Part IV.48

41. See J. S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash. 2015)
(finding that CDA immunity would not apply where Backpage.com’s “content requirements
are specifically designed to control the nature and context of those advertisements so that
pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to traffic in sex, including the trafficking of
children”); see also Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2016)
(finding that CDA immunity did apply to Backpage.com). Similar claims would now be
viable under FOSTA.
42. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
43. Id. at 1166–67.
44. Id. at 1173–74.
45. Id. at 1167–68.
46. See O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016).
47. See Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 722 (Wis. 2019).
48. HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 14–17.
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II. FACEBOOK’S AD-TARGETING PLATFORM
A. Overview
Facebook supports itself by selling advertising that is targeted using the
vast amounts of personal information it gleans from users’ account
information, friend networks, posts and activities on the Facebook site itself,
information about other online activities that Facebook obtains about some
users through various tracking mechanisms, and offline data sources.49
Facebook sells advertising through a sophisticated online platform that can
be used by advertisers, large and small, to target ads to prospective
customers.50 Our description is a snapshot intended as a springboard for our
analysis, rather than a representation of the current status of Facebook’s ad
platform, which is modified often. It is based on the recent empirical work
of Muhammad Ali and Till Speicher.51 Before and subsequent to these
empirical studies, for example, Facebook changed the platform in response
to press reports and claims made in litigation.52 More major modifications
are in the works as part of a 2019 settlement agreement and will be discussed
below.53
The process by which a particular ad is placed before a particular user has
a number of steps.54 First, advertisers supply the content for the ads, choose
from among several approaches for selecting a target audience, and provide
information about their advertising budgets and goals.55 Second, ads are
eventually placed using an auction algorithm which considers advertisers’
objectives and advertising budgets,56 along with “estimated action rates” and
“ad quality and relevance.”57 Facebook’s algorithms for ad targeting and
placement are, of course, proprietary.58
B. Audience Selection Approaches
Facebook offers advertisers several approaches to audience selection.
Here we focus on its two “smart” approaches: attribute-based targeting and

49. See generally Ali et al., supra note 5.
50. Id.
51. See id.; see also Datta et al., supra note 5; Speicher et al., supra note 5; Julia Angwin
et al., Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA
(Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-advertisingdiscrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin [https://perma.cc/UY3V-4923].
52. See, e.g., Sheryl Sandberg, Doing More to Protect Against Discrimination in Housing,
Employment and Credit Advertising, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/03/protecting-against-discrimination-in-ads
[https://perma.cc/9P3A-9KHD].
53. See infra Part II.B.4.
54. Ali et al., supra note 5.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See generally id.
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“lookalike audience” targeting. Empirical studies demonstrate that each can,
at least in principle, result in biased targeting.59
1. Attribute-Based Targeting
Facebook’s attribute-based audience selection permits advertisers to select
audiences based on thousands of attributes which Facebook creates based on
information gleaned from its users’ activities. While some of these
“attributes” are based straightforwardly on Facebook users’ selfidentification in their “profiles,” most are defined and constructed by
Facebook based on data-driven analysis of users’ activities.60 Facebook
offers a menu of attributes divided into categories: demographics, interests,
and behaviors.61 Users can also search for and employ hundreds of thousands
of additional “free-form” attributes.62 As of the time of this writing, the
demographic menu, for example, includes categories such as education,
finances, life events, parents, relationships, and work, which can be drilled
down to more specific attributes such as education level or schools
attended.63 Most of these attributes can be used both to include and to
exclude users.64
The menu for behavioral attributes includes a very large number of
categories, perhaps the most interesting of which is “multicultural affinity.”
According to Facebook, this category is not based on a user’s ethnic identity
but, rather, “represents how interested the user is in content related to
different ethnic communities.”65 Originally called “ethnic affinity,” it was
renamed and removed from the list of possible exclusions after a ProPublica
article exposed that “ethnic affinity” could be used to exclude particular
ethnic groups from targeted audiences.66 Options for “multicultural affinity”
include “African-American, Asian-American, Hispanic-All, HispanicEnglish Dominant, Hispanic-Spanish Dominant, [and] HispanicBilingual.”67
While certain attributes, such as multicultural affinity, age, gender, or
religion, are either protected characteristics or obviously close proxies, there
59. See generally Datta et al., supra note 5; Speicher et al., supra note 5; Ali et al., supra
note 5; Angwin et al., supra note 51.
60. Speicher et al., supra note 5, at 11 (“It is unclear how exactly Facebook infers these
attributes, but from their own description this information can be gathered in many different
ways such as user activity on Facebook pages, apps and services, check-ins with Facebook,
and accesses to external webpages that use Facebook ad technologies.”).
61. Id. at 7.
62. Id. at 11–12.
63. See generally id.; Help Your Ads Find the People Who Will Love Your Business,
FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting [https://perma.cc/
QYT5-69TX] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
64. See Speicher et al., supra note 5, at 7.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id.
67. Jeremy B. Merrill, What We Learned from Collecting 100,000 Targeted Facebook
Ads, PROPUBLICA: ELECTIONLAND (Dec. 26, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/facebook-political-ad-collector-targeted-ads-what-we-learned
[https://perma.cc/
S8YC-Y2MZ].
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are also less obvious attributes or combinations of attributes that function as
reasonably close proxies for such protected characteristics.68
2. Lookalike Audience
To use the lookalike audience approach, an advertiser provides Facebook
with a base audience list and Facebook’s algorithms create an expanded
audience of “similar” people.69 While it is not obvious that demographic
similarity is generally relevant to creating promising audiences for targeted
ads, Speicher has demonstrated that Facebook’s lookalike audiences tend to
reproduce demographic disparity in the base audience.70
3. Changes Required by the 2019 Consent Decree
A class action lawsuit filed by the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA)
against Facebook settled with a consent decree issued in March 2019.71
Among other changes, the consent decree requires Facebook to limit the
ways in which the tools outlined above can be used for targeting housing,
employment, or credit (HEC) ads.72 On or before September 30, 2019,
Facebook will implement a tool called HEC Flow, which will modify the
audience selection tools in four ways.73 First, targeting by zip code will no
longer be an option. Instead, geographic targeting will have to encompass at
least a fifteen-mile radius from the center of a chosen city or address.74
Second, age and gender will no longer be available as targeting criteria for
those categories of ads.75 Third, Facebook promises that “[n]o targeting
options that Facebook determines are direct descriptors of, or semantically
or conceptually related to, a person or group of people based on Protected
Classes will be available” for targeting HEC ads.76 The consent decree
defines “direct descriptors” as “targeting options whose names directly
describe persons in Protected Classes” and defines “semantically or
conceptually related to” as “targeting options whose names appear to be
associated with a Protected [Class].”77
Fourth, the consent decree specifies that the lookalike audiences algorithm
can use data from the country, region, profession, and field of study of a user
68. For example, Speicher found that facially neutral attributes, such as “U.S. Politics:
Very Liberal” and “Interest: Online games,” were disproportionately correlated with
Facebook profiles belonging to Black Facebook users, while facially neutral attributes such as
“U.S. Politics: Very Conservative” and “Interest: Hiking” were disproportionately correlated
with Facebook profiles belonging to White Facebook users. Speicher et al., supra note 5, at
12.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 15–18.
71. Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 1.
72. Id. at 3–4.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Exhibit A, at 3.
77. Id.
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profile but may not consider “age, gender, relationship status, religious
views, school, political views, interested in, or zip code.”78 The lookalike
audiences tool may, however, continue to use all data about user behavior on
the site (such as ad engagement, apps, or pages), with the exception of
Facebook groups.79 The decree further requires Facebook to rename the tool
so that it does not “refer to finding users who ‘look like’ users provided by
advertisers.”80 It also requires that Facebook provide a “Housing Search
Portal,” such that users will be able to search all housing ads posted on
Facebook, regardless of whether they are in the targeted audience.81
III. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY AND AUTOMATED ADTARGETING PLATFORMS
In some contexts, such as housing, employment, and credit, U.S. laws
prohibit private party discrimination, including discriminatory advertising,
based on “protected” attributes, which commonly include race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, age, and disability. Our case study focuses on
discriminatory housing advertising, which is prohibited under the Fair
Housing Act. Part III.A explains the FHA’s standards for determining
whether actionable discriminatory advertising has occurred and who can be
held liable for actionable discrimination, highlighting unsettled questions
about the standard that would apply to disparate ad targeting. Part III.B then
considers whether and how an ad-targeting platform such as Facebook might
be held liable for discrimination resulting from attribute-based or lookalike
audience ad targeting. In this Part, we set aside the question of CDA 230
protection, which is addressed in Part V.
A. Discriminatory Ad Targeting Under the Fair Housing Act
The FHA makes it unlawful:
to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or
an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.82

We divide our discussion of potential liability into two inquiries. First, has
actionable discrimination occurred under the FHA? Second, if so, who is
liable?
1. Has Actionable Discrimination Occurred?
Discriminatory housing advertising claims are generally evaluated based
on whether an “ordinary reader” of the ad would have perceived an unlawful
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).

416

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

“preference, limitation, or discrimination.”83 The FHA’s “ordinary reader”
standard stands out from other discrimination standards under the FHA and
elsewhere because the defendant’s intentions, purposes, or reasons are
largely irrelevant under the standard, which has been characterized as a
“strict liability” provision.84 Although most of the case law under these
provisions involves advertising content, discriminatory ad targeting is also
actionable according to regulations promulgated by HUD, which is
responsible for enforcing the FHA.
Under the regulations, discriminatory advertising includes “[s]electing
media or locations for advertising the sale or rental of dwellings which deny
particular segments of the housing market information about housing
opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,
or national origin.”85 The regulations also prohibit “limiting information, by
word or conduct, regarding suitably priced dwellings available for
inspection, sale or rental, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin.”86
Former HUD guidelines provide the following further examples of
actionable selective advertising:
[T]he use of English language media alone or the exclusive use of media
catering to the majority population in an area, when, in such area, there are
also available non-English language or other minority media, may have
discriminatory impact. . . . The following are examples of the selective use
of advertisements which may be discriminatory:
(a) Selective geographic advertisements. Such selective use may
involve the strategic placement of billboards; brochure advertisements
distributed within a limited geographic area by hand or in the mail;
advertising in particular geographic coverage editions of major
metropolitan newspapers or in newspapers of limited circulation which are
mainly advertising vehicles for reaching a particular segment of the
community; or displays or announcements available only in selected sales
offices.87

Since the effects of discriminatory targeting are the same whether it is
accomplished by selective use of particular media or by automated targeting,
it is unsurprising that HUD has taken the position that the FHA’s
discriminatory advertising prohibitions reach such automated targeting.88

83. See, e.g., Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 1993)
(Ragin II); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (Ragin I).
84. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, A Social Norm Theory of Regulating Housing Speech
Under the Fair Housing Act, 84 MO. L. REV. 435, 441–45 (2019).
85. 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(c)(3) (2019).
86. 24 C.F.R. § 100.80(b)(4) (2019).
87. 24 C.F.R. § 109.25 (1995) (withdrawn from the C.F.R by Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity; Regulatory Reinvention; Streamlining of
HUD’s Regulations Implementing the Fair Housing Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,378 (Apr. 1, 1996)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 100, 103, and 109)).
88. See HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 23–24; HUD v. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-180323-8, at 1–2 (Charge of Discrimination Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.hud.gov/
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There are, as yet, no judicial opinions that apply the FHA to automated
behavioral ad targeting and it remains unclear what standard courts should
apply to assess whether disparate ad targeting is discriminatory under the
FHA. HUD invoked the ordinary reader standard in a recent brief in the
Facebook advertising litigation, but neither that brief nor the few judicial
opinions touching on more traditional ad targeting provide much explanation
of how the ordinary reader standard should be applied.89
Traditionally, the ordinary reader standard turns on readers’ likely
perceptions of the content of the ad, regardless of advertisers’ intentions.90
Discriminatory ad targeting cannot be assessed on the basis of ad content,
however, which begs the question of what the ordinary reader would look at
to judge whether actionable discrimination has occurred. One possible
approach would consider whether the demographic makeup of the ultimate
target audience would indicate a prohibited “preference, limitation, or
discrimination” to an ordinary reader.91 This first approach seems in tune
with the ordinary reader standard’s broad remedial approach but raises
questions about whether an ordinary reader has a reasonable basis for judging
ad audience demographics. An alternative approach might instead consider
the ordinary reader’s perspective on the ad-targeting plan or process.92 This
second approach also raises questions about the competence of ordinary
readers, particularly where complicated automated targeting tools are used.
In addition, it might belie the purpose of the ordinary reader standard by
lacking sensitivity to the targeting’s real-world impact on potential
customers.
Given that discriminatory ad targeting may have little or nothing to do with
how readers perceive ad content, courts might instead set aside the ordinary
reader approach in favor of the disparate treatment or impact approaches
applied to other aspects of housing discrimination.93 Under these theories, a
burden-shifting approach is applied. Plaintiffs must first prove a prima facie
case showing either that they were treated differently based on a protected
characteristic or that a practice (here, ad targeting) disparately impacted a
protected class.94 The defendant may then either rebut the prima facie case
sites/dfiles/FHEO/documents/HUD%20v%20Facebook%20-%20Charge.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BT8Q-M6RX] [hereinafter HUD Charge].
89. See HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11.
90. See, e.g., Miami Valley Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Connor Grp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 396, 407
(S.D. Ohio 2011).
91. Id. at 406 (quoting Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006)).
92. Id. at 411 (“In cases like this, where the ads in question are part of a large advertising
campaign, but are not facially discriminatory, courts have found it appropriate to look at the
entire advertising campaign to help determine whether there is an FHA violation.”).
93. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2518–26 (2015).
94. Id. at 2523. For an overview of these approaches and a discussion of how they might
apply to data-driven models, see Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 694–712 (2016). Note that HUD has recently issued a
proposed rule that would heighten the standard under 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 for a prima facie
case based on disparate impact. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate
Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,858–59 (Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
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or produce evidence that there was a nondiscriminatory “legitimate reason”
or “business necessity” for the treatment or practice.95 Plaintiffs may rebut
the proffered reason by demonstrating that it is pretextual or, in a disparate
impact analysis, that there is a reasonable, less discriminatory alternative.96
The outcomes of particular cases will, of course, turn upon which of these
(or some other) standards courts eventually adopt.
2. Who Is Liable?
24 C.F.R. § 100.7 governs who can be held liable, assuming actionable
discrimination can be established.97 Direct liability is broadly construed to
include not only a person’s “own conduct that results in a discriminatory
housing practice” but also a person’s “fail[ure] to take prompt action to
correct and end a discriminatory housing practice by a third-party, where the
person knew or should have known of the discriminatory conduct and had
the power to correct it.”98
Courts have held not only advertisers but also intermediaries, such as
newspapers and listing services, liable for discriminatory advertising.99 A
recent opinion considered the potential liability of a tenant-screening service

pt. 100). The proposed rule also provides standards for defendants to rebut the plaintiff’s
prima facie case if it alleges that the “cause of a discriminatory effect is a model used by the
defendant, such as a risk assessment algorithm.” Id. at 42,862. If adopted as final, the proposed
rule changes are expected to make it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to prove
discrimination under a disparate impact theory and to restrict the claims that can be brought
based on defendants’ use of automated algorithms. See, e.g., Emily Badger, Who’s to Blame
When Algorithms Discriminate?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/20/upshot/housing-discrimination-algorithms-hud.html
[https://perma.cc/T23LJE8P]; Lola Fadulu, Trump Proposal Would Raise Bar for Proving Housing Discrimination,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/us/politics/trump-housingdiscrimination.html [https://perma.cc/XR3K-ENK6]. It appears, however, that the proposed
rule changes do not have substantial implications for the arguments made in this Article, which
mostly do not depend on specifics of the disparate impact standard. In particular, the proposed
rule changes do not amend either 24 C.F.R. § 100.75, which deals with discriminatory
advertising, or any of the relevant provisions of 24 C.F.R. § 100.7, which determines who can
be held liable for discrimination under the FHA. It is also worth noting that the HUD charge
against Facebook, which was issued not long before the proposed rule, claims discrimination
based on both attribute-based and lookalike audience targeting, which suggests that HUD itself
does not view its proposed rule changes as inconsistent with ad-targeting platform liability
under the FHA.
95. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 94, at 696, 701.
96. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
97. The regulation was adopted in 2016, but, according to HUD’s responses to comments,
“Section 100.7 does not create liability that does not already exist” and “helps clarify the Act’s
coverage for residents and housing providers.” Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment
Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act,
81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,066–67 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). It
provides for both direct liability in section (a) and vicarious liability for the actions of an agent
or employee in section (b). Here we concern ourselves only with direct liability.
98. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2019).
99. See, e.g., Ragin I, 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991).
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that provided automated criminal records analyses to landlords.100 While not
based on discriminatory advertising, this opinion is instructive regarding the
question of who is directly liable under the FHA.101 The court held that the
screening service’s own conduct was actionable because “[a]llowing a
screening company to facilitate discrimination by disqualifying qualified
applicants on an impermissible basis or by allowing a customer to set
impermissible qualification standards with impunity would subvert the
purpose of the FHA.”102 Alternatively, the service could be liable for failing
to correct the landlord’s discriminatory conduct because it had “held itself
out as a company with the knowledge and ingenuity to screen housing
applicants by interpreting criminal records and specifically advertised its
ability to improve ‘Fair Housing compliance’” and had “a duty not to sell a
product to a customer which would unwittingly cause its customer to violate
federal housing law and regulations.”103
B. Ad-Targeting Platform Liability Under the FHA
This section explores how the FHA’s liability standards might apply to
disparate ad targeting resulting from the use of attribute-based and lookalike
audience ad-targeting tools. As discussed in Part III.A, the FHA standard for
discriminatory ad targeting is unsettled and certainly raises interesting
questions. Here, however, our exploration of FHA ad-targeting liability is
aimed at illuminating our understanding of how CDA 230’s breadth affects
substantive regulation, particularly for “smart” services. Because CDA 230
only matters when service providers would otherwise be held liable, the
discussion generally assumes actionable discrimination has occurred and
focuses on whether ad-targeting platforms are likely to be liable for that
discrimination. It delves into the potential substantive standards only to the
extent that they have implications for that question.
This section first considers the possibility that smart platforms such as
Facebook generally have so much information about how ads are targeted to
their users that they should essentially always be held liable for failure to
correct advertisers’ discriminatory ad targeting, regardless of the targeting
process. Setting that possibility aside, it then considers the potential for adplatform liability under the FHA based on advertisers’ use of attribute-based
and lookalike audience selection tools.
1. Should Smart Platforms Always Be Liable for Failure to Correct?
As noted above, FHA liability can attach not only for a defendant’s own
conduct but also for failure to correct discriminatory conduct that the
defendant knew or should have known about and had the power to correct.104
100. See generally Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Corelogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F.
Supp. 3d 362 (D. Conn. 2019).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 372.
103. Id.
104. See supra Part III.A.
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Ad-targeting platforms have complete power over the design of their adplacement systems and the eventual placement of ads.105 In this respect, they
are much like the tenant-screening service held responsible when its
automated tool produced criminal history evaluations used in a landlord’s
discriminatory decisions.106 Arguably, a platform’s ultimate control over its
ad placement system always gives it sufficient “power to correct”
discriminatory ad targeting,107 even though it does not control the various
choices its advertisers make when using its audience selection tools. If so,
an ad-targeting platform’s liability under the FHA will turn on whether it
“should have known” about an advertiser’s discriminatory practices.108
A smart ad-targeting platform, such as Facebook, has extensive
information about how ads are targeted on its platform: it knows what
attributes its advertisers select, can analyze ad content, and has a wealth of
relevant knowledge about its users, both within and outside of the audience
that is ultimately targeted.109 Arguably, this data and technical capacity
mean that a smart ad-targeting platform “should know” whenever any
targeted audience has a significantly disparate makeup.110 Liability would
then flow from the platform’s failure to correct the disparity by readjusting
the audience. Though this argument for platform liability is perhaps novel in
the FHA context, it is not as extreme as it might sound. A smart platform is
often the only party with either the capacity to detect discriminatory ad
targeting or the power to correct it. Moreover, this understanding of the
“failure to correct” standard would amount, in essence, to imposing a duty
on ad-targeting platforms that is rather similar to the negligence standard
applied to traditional publishers.
Of course, courts may not adopt such a sweeping view of ad-targeting
platform power and knowledge. Even so, “failure to correct” liability might
arise from the features of particular targeting tools, as discussed during the
evaluation of liability for attribute-based and lookalike audience targeting in
the next two subsections.
2. FHA Liability Arising from Attribute-Based Targeting
While we are primarily interested in platform liability, we begin by
discussing advertiser liability, as a point of comparison and a potential basis
for a platform’s liability for “failure to correct.”

105. See supra Part II.
106. See Corelogic, 369 F. Supp. 3d at 374.
107. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii) (2019).
108. Id.
109. See supra Part II.B.
110. How to determine what a smart platform “should know” is a fascinating question,
which we do not consider further in this Article.
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a. Advertiser Liability
Courts would almost certainly hold housing advertisers liable for choosing
targeting attributes that are direct or reasonably apparent proxies for
protected characteristics, either under an ordinary reader standard or because
advertisers would be hard-pressed to come up with legitimate reasons for
such targeting. If disparate targeting results from less obviously problematic
attribute choices, however, the outcome might depend on the substantive
standard. We can presume for sake of argument that the disparity in the
ultimate target audience would indicate a “preference, limitation, or
discrimination” to an “ordinary reader” or create a prima facie case of
disparate impact.111 Moreover, a housing advertiser might have considerable
difficulty providing legitimate reasons for targeting based on attributes that
bear no apparent relationship to protected characteristics if they also seem
unrelated to an individual’s likely interest in a particular housing ad or
suitability as a tenant or purchaser. Many, if not most, of the attributes that
Facebook makes available for ad targeting are of this ilk. Under a standard
based on the ordinary reader’s perception of an advertiser’s targeting plan,
however, plaintiffs might be much less successful.
b. Platform Liability
For attribute-based targeting, the platform’s “own conduct” entails
choosing, defining, and computing the attributes its tool offers and making
them available to housing advertisers.112 In a “but-for” sense, this conduct
“results in” any actionable targeting that occurs, but such a sweeping
interpretation is probably beyond the scope of even the FHA’s “strict
liability” approach to advertising discrimination. Distinctions can be drawn
between various types of ad-targeting platform conduct relating to attributebased targeting.

111. Making the prima facie case would be more difficult under HUD’s proposed
modifications to 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, particularly because it requires plaintiffs to state facts
plausibly alleging that a challenged policy or practice is “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary
to achieve a valid interest or legitimate objective such as a practical business, profit, policy
consideration, or requirement of law.” HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,862 (Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100). Arguably, however, our arguments regarding the absence of legitimate
reasons for targeting housing ads based on certain attributes might also satisfy this
requirement.
112. HUD’s proposed rule for disparate impact claims permits defendants to rebut a prima
facie case alleging that “the cause of a discriminatory effect is a model used by the defendant,
such as a risk assessment algorithm” if the defendant
[p]rovides the material factors that make up the inputs used in the challenged model
and shows that these factors do not rely in any material part on factors that are
substitutes or close proxies for protected classes under the Fair Housing Act and that
the model is predictive of credit risk or other similar valid objective.
Id. It is not at all obvious that attribute-based targeting involves the sort of predictive model
covered by this provision or that allegations involving discriminatory attribute-based targeting
amount to alleging that such a model is the “cause” of the discriminatory effect.
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Consider first a platform’s conduct in providing targeting attributes that
are direct or apparent proxies for protected characteristics. Facebook has
argued that, because its attribute-based tool is intended for general-purpose
advertising, it cannot be liable merely for offering attributes that cannot be
legally used to target housing ads.113 However, the platform’s own conduct
extends beyond designing an attribute-based tool that allows advertisers to
select proxies for protected characteristics. It includes whether and how the
platform marketed its attribute-based ad-targeting tool to housing advertisers
and what, if anything, it does to inform housing advertisers or to prevent or
discourage them from selecting prohibited targeting attributes. The totality
of this conduct might be taken to “result in” discriminatory targeting even if
merely including proxies for protected attributes in a general-purpose tool
does not.
A platform’s own conduct also includes defining, naming, and often
inferring the attributes it offers. A platform might thus incur liability if it
provides attributes that are defined, named, or inferred in a biased way that
results in discriminatory targeting. For example, suppose an advertiser
selects financial attributes that appear to be relevant to whether an ad
recipient would be able to afford the housing on offer, but the inferences
made by the platform’s algorithms in assigning those attributes to users were
systematically inaccurate for certain protected classes. While the advertiser’s
selection of those attributes would not appear discriminatory to an ordinary
reader and would seem justified by legitimate business reasons, the platform
might well be liable under any standard for constructing the attributes in a
biased way.
If a platform successfully argues that its own conduct did not result in
actionable housing discrimination, might it still be held liable for “failure to
correct” its advertisers’ attribute selections that resulted in discriminatory
targeting? Unless courts adopt the expansive view of platform power and
knowledge presented in Part III.B.1, it seems unlikely that platforms will be
deemed to have the requisite power to control advertisers’ attribute
selections.
3. FHA Liability Arising from Lookalike Audience Selection
The lookalike audience tool shifts the burden of responsibility for audience
selection almost entirely onto the platform’s shoulders, often leaving it as the
only potential discriminatory ad-targeting defendant. As a result, the

113. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or Alternatively
to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Complaint at 27, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook,
Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018), ECF No. 40 [hereinafter Facebook
Brief] (“Facebook—as a website that publishes ads for many different types of goods and
services, not just housing—is fundamentally different from a multiple-listing service or
brokers’ organization, which are run by brokers themselves for the sole and express purpose
of offering and promoting housing opportunities.”).
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likelihood of platform liability grows, while the likelihood of advertiser
liability diminishes.114
a. Advertiser Liability
Any advertiser liability for discriminatory targeting resulting from
lookalike audience selection must arise from disparities in the base audience
submitted by the advertiser. Because of the attenuated connection between
the base audience and the demographics of the lookalike audience, however,
such grounds for advertiser liability seem relatively weak. While the base
audience provided by an advertiser helps determine the lookalike audience
in a “but-for” sense, a court might—and perhaps should—conclude that it is
the platform’s similarity algorithm, rather than the advertiser’s “own
conduct,” that “results in” a disparately targeted lookalike audience.115
Facebook’s website currently says that a “Lookalike Audience is a way to
reach new people who are likely to be interested in your business because
they’re similar to your best existing customers.”116 In light of this promise,
an ad-targeting plan that simply involves submitting a base audience of
existing customers is unlikely to be perceived as problematic by an “ordinary
reader.” Under a disparate impact analysis, targeting ads to “people who are
likely to be interested in your business” also provides a seemingly legitimate
reason for employing the tool. Facebook’s “similarity” metric is secret,
leaving advertisers no grounds to anticipate how the base audiences they
supply will influence the demographics of the lookalike audience. Indeed,
based on Facebook’s statement, an advertiser might even hope that the
lookalike audience tool would expand its target audience to include likely
customers from currently underrepresented groups. In sum, advertisers
neither control nor understand how a lookalike audience selection tool
depends on the demographics of the base audience. It thus seems quite
possible that courts would conclude that advertisers’ base audience
submissions do not “result in” discriminatory ad targeting that emerges in the
lookalike audience.

114. If courts adopt a disparate impact approach to automated ad targeting, HUD’s
proposed changes to 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 seem most likely to affect claims involving lookalike
audience targeting. Under the proposed rule, ad-targeting platforms might attempt to rebut a
prima facie case by demonstrating that their similarity algorithms avoid using attributes that
are “substitutes or close proxies for protected classes.” HUD’s Implementation of the Fair
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,862. If courts take the proposed
rule’s standard seriously, however, rebuttal also requires defendants to demonstrate that their
algorithm’s version of “similarity” metric is a “valid objective.” Id. That may be a trickier
task if the algorithm produces disparately composed lookalike audiences.
115. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2019).
116. Create a Lookalike Audience, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/
help/465262276878947 [https://perma.cc/8EDF-S6RM] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
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b. Platform Liability
Ad platforms may well be directly liable for discriminatory lookalike
audience targeting based on their “own conduct” in designing and
implementing algorithms that “result in” lookalike audience disparities.
Such a platform might find it awkward to argue that the advertiser’s base
audience selection is to blame because such an argument would suggest that
the platform’s lookalike audience tool tracks the base audience’s balance of
protected characteristics—an assertion platforms would presumably want to
avoid. Moreover, a general-purpose tool argument seems unpersuasive when
applied to a lookalike audience tool that promises to use the platform’s user
data and algorithm to find promising customers for an advertiser’s business.
In the unlikely event that a court decides that an advertiser’s submission
of a disparate base audience resulted in discriminatory targeting while the adtargeting platform’s algorithm design did not, plaintiffs would have a
particularly strong argument for holding the platform liable for “failure to
correct” the discriminatory targeting. Whereas the general “failure to
correct” argument described in Part III.B.1 would define what an ad-targeting
platform “should have known” by the data available to it, a lookalike
audience algorithm must actually analyze the attributes of both base and
lookalike audience members in order to assess similarity. Moreover,
Facebook’s promise to create lookalike audiences that are “likely to be
interested in your business”117 suggests that its lookalike audience algorithm
analyzes the content of the ad and thus that it “should know” when it is
dealing with a housing ad.
4. Possible Impact of the Consent Decree
The changes required by the March 2019 consent decree will lower the
overall chances of an underlying FHA violation in several ways. Eliminating
the options to target housing ads by zip code, gender, age, and other attributes
highly correlated with protected classes makes it less likely that advertisers
will use Facebook’s tools to discriminate. Likewise, limiting the factors the
lookalike audience algorithm considers in assessing similarity may result in
less disparate results. It is by no means clear, however, that these changes
will substantially reduce discriminatory housing ad targeting or protect
Facebook from future liability.118
Many unprotected targeting attributes will continue to be available to
housing advertisers even though they appear to be irrelevant to reasonable
housing ad targeting. If selecting such attributes produces disparate
targeting, advertisers might still have trouble providing legitimate reasons for
using them and Facebook may not be any more persuasive in articulating
legitimate reasons for including them as options for housing advertising. It
is similarly hard to imagine legitimate reasons, in the housing context, for
117. Id.
118. The changes may be more protective, however, if courts decide to apply a disparate
impact analysis and HUD’s proposed changes to 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 are adopted.
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relying on many of the attributes that the settlement permits Facebook to
continue using to create lookalike audiences.
IV. CDA 230 IMMUNITY AND AUTOMATED AD TARGETING
As discussed in Part I.B, aside from making mostly unsuccessful
arguments for a narrower interpretation of “publisher,” plaintiffs have
focused on two types of arguments against CDA 230 immunity: (1) that the
claims at issue do not treat the defendant as a speaker or publisher; and (2)
that the service provider is an information content provider responsible for
the development of actionable content by materially contributing to it (often
through the design of its services) or inducing it. This Part considers how
these arguments are likely to fare against CDA 230 assertions by ad-targeting
platforms.
A. Ad Targeting as a Publisher Activity?
In general, targeting advertising is quite likely to be considered a
“publisher” activity under CDA 230. As Facebook argues in litigation:
Publishers routinely allow advertisers to target ads and assist them in doing
so. For instance, newspapers sell advertising space to sporting goods
store[s] in the sports section and broadcast networks sell airtime to
advertisers on different channels during different shows depending on the
preferred audience. The publication of ads entails more than displaying
them; it also entails allowing advertisers the ability to reach their target
audience.119

The NFHA counters that while “[a] traditional ‘publisher’ is a website that
‘reviews material submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for style or
technical fluency, and then decides whether to publish it,’”120 “Facebook’s
conduct goes far beyond this ‘reviewing’ and ‘editing’”121 and its adtargeting service thus is not a “publisher” function under the CDA.122
Facebook correctly notes, however, that “[c]ourts have consistently held in
analogous contexts that ad targeting is a traditional publisher function
protected by the CDA.”123
While it seems likely that courts would credit Facebook’s argument that
ad targeting is generally a “publisher” activity, plaintiffs might nonetheless
argue that CDA 230 does not preclude liability based on a platform’s “failure
to correct” advertiser discrimination because such claims do not treat the

119. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 24–25.
120. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue or
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 15, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2019), ECF No. 49 [hereinafter
NFHA Reply Brief] (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 25 (first citing Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com
LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016); then citing Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
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platform as a publisher. In Espinoza v. County of Orange, a court recently
denied an employer CDA 230 immunity for claims alleging an employer’s
“failure to investigate and resolve” discriminatory workplace harassment,124
where the harassment involved derogatory blog postings made by coworkers
using work computers.125 The court noted that the “plaintiff is not arguing
defendant is the publisher of the blog postings” and that the “defendant’s
breach was not based on its employees’ use of their work computers but on
its own failure to investigate and resolve the problem.”126 An FHA plaintiff
could advance a similar argument that liability for “failure to correct”
discriminatory ad targeting does not treat the ad platform as a publisher.
Under current CDA 230 precedent, courts are unlikely to be convinced of
the analogy. Espinoza alleged that his employer should have resolved the
harassment by policing its employees’ use of work computers more
effectively, an action unrelated to publishing.127 Correcting discriminatory
ad targeting, however, necessarily means either directly modifying the target
audience or changing how it is selected, actions that seem quite similar to the
steps that a conventional publisher would take to avoid publishing
discriminatory ads.
Courts are thus likely to conclude that ad targeting is at least generally a
“publisher” activity and to reject plaintiffs’ arguments that “failure to
correct” claims in particular are beyond the scope of CDA 230. For the most
part, then, plaintiffs’ success will depend on whether ad-targeting platforms
are treated as “information content providers” under CDA 230.
B. Ad-Targeting Platforms as Information Content Providers?
A party engaged in nominally publisher-type activities is not immune
under CDA 230 to the extent it acts as an “information content provider”
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through [an] interactive computer service.”128 In the
NFHA litigation, Facebook argued that it is not an “information content
provider” of discriminatorily targeted advertising because “[p]laintiffs do
not, and cannot, allege that Facebook ‘materially contribut[ed] to [the]
alleged unlawfulness’ of the content or ‘assisted in the development of what
made the content unlawful.’”129 The NFHA and HUD responded that
Facebook is an “information content provider” because: (1) it “seizes upon
124. Espinoza v. County of Orange, No. G043067, 2012 WL 420149, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 9, 2012); see also Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding
no immunity where an “obligation to warn could have been satisfied without changes to the
content posted by the website’s users”). But see Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Harvard Univ.,
377 F. Supp. 3d 49, 66 (D. Mass. 2019) (CDA 230 applies even “when a plaintiff claims
disability discrimination based on a lack of access rather than on the content of speech.”).
125. Espinoza, 2012 WL 420149, at *2–3.
126. Id. at *9.
127. See id. at *8–9.
128. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012); see supra Part I.B.
129. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 19 (quoting FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838
F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016)).
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benign content posted by its users—not merely sex and location but also
personal interests, demographic information, and browsing history—to
actively classify its users into categories” that enable discriminatory ad
targeting; (2) its “ad utilities . . . invite housing providers to express unlawful
demographic and other audience preferences,” making “Facebook and the
advertiser . . . co-developers of each targeted ad”;130 and (3) it develops the
“information” contained in the attributes offered by its targeting platform.131
These arguments illustrate the difficulty in applying CDA 230 to
Facebook’s ad-targeting platform and similar smart services. Facebook is
clearly correct that its targeting tools have nothing to do with developing the
third-party ad content. While HUD and the NFHA make plausible arguments
that Facebook is, nonetheless, materially responsible for discriminatory ad
targeting, they have some difficulty shoehorning this responsibility into CDA
230’s “information content provider” definition, which naturally focuses on
contributions to “content.” These tensions, also reflected in judicial opinions
grappling with the “information content provider” definition, reflect deep
issues with the structure and interpretation of CDA 230, which we analyze
further below.
For now, we analyze how FHA claims against ad-targeting platforms
would fare under the CDA 230 test preferred by the plaintiffs in the NFHA
litigation, which evaluates whether a platform is “responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development” of discriminatory ad targeting, using
the approach developed in Roommates.com.132 Moreover, whatever the
eventual scope of “failure to correct” liability under the FHA, only an adtargeting platform’s “own conduct” can turn it into an “information content
provider” that is ineligible for CDA 230 immunity.
1. Attribute-Based Audience Selection
The Roommates.com analysis contrasted “neutral tools” with online
services that made “material contributions” to third-party actionable conduct.
In litigation over its ad-targeting tools, Facebook emphasizes that “[a]
material contribution to the alleged illegality of content [under the CDA] . . .
means being responsible for what makes the displayed content allegedly
unlawful”133 and contends that it does nothing to require or encourage
advertisers to select attributes that result in disparate audiences.134 It argues
further that its “provision of neutral tools that . . . may be used by some
advertisers for an unlawful purpose falls squarely within the scope of CDA
immunity.”135
130. HUD Brief, supra note 6, at 18, 21, 22.
131. See NFHA Reply Brief, supra note 120, at 16.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 9, Mobley v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017), ECF No. 34 (quoting Jones v. Dirty World
Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014)).
134. Id. at 19.
135. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 2.
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Plaintiffs, in contrast, argue that Facebook’s active involvement in
defining, developing, and assigning attributes to users and offering them to
advertisers materially contributes to discriminatory targeting,136 particularly
when the available attributes include protected characteristics.137
Analogizing to Roommates.com, they argue further that “[w]hen a business
enterprise extracts such information from potential customers [about their
protected statuses] as a condition of accepting them as clients, . . . the
enterprise is responsible, at least in part, for developing that information.”138
These opposing contentions demonstrate that “neutral tools” and “material
contributions” are not simply two sides of the same coin. Attribute-based
targeting is neutral in that it can be used to target housing (and other)
advertising in either a discriminatory or nondiscriminatory fashion.
Nonetheless, Facebook’s design and definition of attributes that proxy for
protected characteristics do contribute materially to the development of any
discriminatory ad targeting that makes use of them.
It is hard to predict how a court would come out on this issue. Given the
general tendency of courts to favor immunity, Facebook may have the better
of the argument139 and ad-targeting platforms may ordinarily be shielded
from liability for discriminatory attribute-based targeting.
2. Lookalike Audience
A platform’s role in designing the algorithm used to create a lookalike
audience tool undoubtedly contributes materially to whether disparate
targeting results. Whether the lookalike audience tool is nonetheless a
“‘neutral tool[]’ protected by the CDA,”140 as Facebook contends, depends
on what “neutral” means in this context. If “neutral” describes a tool that
was not designed to promote discrimination, lookalike audience targeting
may be neutral. If, on the other hand, “neutral” means that the user, not the
tool designer, controls whether the outcome is discriminatory or
nondiscriminatory, lookalike audiences targeting is definitely not neutral. As
discussed in Part III.B.2.b, while they contribute a “base audience,”
advertisers have essentially no say whatsoever in whether the lookalike
audiences used to target their ads are disparately targeted. While it remains
unclear how courts will resolve the “neutral tool” question, plaintiffs’
arguments against CDA 230 immunity for ad-targeting platforms are
certainly strongest for the lookalike audience tool.

136. NFHA Reply Brief, supra note 120, at 16.
137. See, e.g., id. at 3.
138. Id. at 10–11.
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 21 (quoting Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
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C. Putting It All Together: Can Plaintiffs Recover Against Ad-Targeting
Platforms?
Putting Parts III and IV together, overall, we would roughly expect that:
(1) failure to correct claims are likely to fail because of CDA 230 immunity;
(2) attribute-based targeting claims are somewhat likely to be viable under
the FHA but reasonably likely to fail nonetheless because of CDA 230; and
(3) lookalike audience–based claims are the most likely to succeed under
both the FHA and CDA 230. If ad-targeting platforms are successful in
claiming CDA 230 protection, plaintiffs may have no recourse because
advertisers are unlikely to be held liable.
V. SMART SERVICES, SECONDARY LIABILITY, AND CDA 230
Though not ordinarily framed in these terms, the tensions and trade-offs
underlying the controversy about CDA 230 immunity are helpfully
understood by reference to debates about various forms of secondary
liability.141
A. Secondary Liability Paradigms
Secondary liability often aims to enlist the assistance of large,
institutionalized, deep-pocketed players in enforcing laws when enforcement
against those who are directly liable is ineffective or costly.142 It can also be
intended to rein in the behavior of intermediaries who facilitate the
underlying illegality or amplify its harms. Secondary liability routinely
provokes controversy about who is an appropriate defendant and what level
of culpability or mental state should be required. When the boundaries
between legal and illegal underlying behavior are not bright,143 there is often
fear that secondary liability defendants, who may have more to lose and more
litigation risk than direct liability defendants, will overcompensate. The
extent to which overcompensation is either likely or problematic depends on
the context and the type of secondary liability involved.144
Secondary liability can be divided into four basic types: (1) what we will
term “monitor and control” liability, exemplified by vicarious liability for
those with a right, ability, or duty to control the actions of those directly
liable; (2) notice-based liability; (3) liability for inducement of a third party’s
actionable conduct; and (4) contributory liability based on facilitating or
contributing to actionable conduct. Secondary liability often requires some
141. Note that the immunity framework provided by CDA 230 has been referenced in the
context of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and the issues with a safe harbor
approach to internet service provider (ISP) copyright immunity given the state of the modern
internet. See, e.g., Katherine Burkhart, Note, Mavrix v. LiveJournal: Unsafe Harbors in the
Age of Social Media, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1015, 1029–33 (2018).
142. See Wu, supra note 16, at 302–04.
143. This is obviously true of speech-related claims but also for claims involving
intellectual property infringement where there are gray lines between socially beneficial uses
and infringement.
144. See generally Wu, supra note 16; Grimmelmann, supra note 16.
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level of knowledge or intent; the appropriate level for a given context is
debatable. Courts and commentators have grappled extensively with
secondary liability for online copyright infringement, which is a useful
comparator here since some (though not all) of the underlying policy issues
are similar.145
1. Publishers, Distributors, and Secondary Liability
Because defamation doctrine was the mental model underlying CDA 230,
we use its relationship to secondary liability as a framework for introducing
secondary liability. Defamation involves the communication of content that
is false and harmful to reputation.146 The doctrine distinguishes between
original speakers, (re-)publishers, and those who “merely [make] available
to another equipment or facilities that he may use himself for general
communication purposes.”147
Original speakers and publishers are ordinarily held liable even if they are
only negligent,148 meaning they did not act “reasonably in checking on the
truth or falsity or defamatory character of the communication before
publishing it.”149 The duty to check varies contextually. For example,
professional publishers, such as newspapers, are judged by the “skill and
experience normally possessed by members of that profession.”150 While
publisher liability is framed as direct liability, it is effectively a form of
secondary liability premised on actionable third-party content.
Publisher liability is one form of “monitor and control” liability. Like
vicarious liability, it subjects certain secondary parties to affirmative duties
to monitor others’ behavior, but the negligence standard makes the duty less
absolute. Olivier Sylvain’s suggestion to require online service providers to
make “good faith” efforts to screen for discrimination is another sort of
“monitor and control” standard.151 Depending on the stringency of the
standard and the cost and feasibility of distinguishing actionable from
permissible third-party behavior,152 “monitor and control” liability can
incentivize overenforcement, including “collateral censorship.”
Distributors, such as booksellers and news vendors, are liable only if they
know or have reason to know specific content is defamatory.153 Distributor
liability is a form of notice-based liability. The Digital Millennium
145. See Grimmelmann, supra note 16.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–59 (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
147. Id. § 581 cmt. b. This terminology can be a bit confusing because the communication
element of defamation is also called “publication.” Id. § 558. References to “publisher
liability,” as well as interpretations of CDA 230’s use of the term, however, connote
republishers of third-party content.
148. For exceptions, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 583–612 (AM. LAW INST.
1976). Most notably, for statements about public figures, see id. § 580A.
149. Id. § 580B cmt. g.
150. Id.
151. Sylvain, supra note 25.
152. Wu, supra note 16; Grimmelmann, supra note 16.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1976); see id. cmt. b.
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Copyright Act’s (DMCA) “safe harbor” for online service providers who
adopt a statutory “notice and takedown” regime provides another example.154
While notice-based liability relieves secondary parties of monitoring duties,
it can still incentivize overenforcement, especially when it is difficult or
costly to evaluate whether a user’s conduct is actionable.155 Service
providers may then respond by censoring conduct too readily. Especially in
the online context, this may incentivize dubious notices, which ratchet up
service provider costs and create a feedback loop. As James Grimmelmann
puts it, while defamation “is a doctrinal swamp where cases often turn on
subtle nuances of meaning,” copyright seems like a promising context for
online notice-based liability, since “the prima facie question of whether a
particular piece of content is or is not a nearly identical copy of a particular
copyrighted work is something a platform can delegate to a hashing
algorithm.”156 Nonetheless, the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime is
widely criticized for allowing “take-down” without adequate proof of the
underlying infringement.157
The degree to which notice-based liability fosters overenforcement also
depends on the duties imposed on secondary parties. A service provider is
only eligible for the DMCA safe harbor, for example, if it “responds
expeditiously to remove” allegedly infringing material “upon
notification.”158 Although users can dispute the takedown later, based on fair
use and other defenses, the DMCA essentially codifies overenforcement.
FHA “failure to correct” liability is also a version of notice-based liability,
given its “knew or should have known” trigger. Neither the standard nor the
context invites the knee-jerk overenforcement mandated by the DMCA,
however. Because of the variations possible among both notice-based and
“monitor and control” regimes, and particularly because of the issue of
dubious notices in the online context, there is no single answer to which sort
of regime creates greater overenforcement incentives.
2. Contributory Liability
Contributory liability159 attaches to a secondary party who contributes to
or facilitates another party’s actionable behavior but whose conduct is not
directly actionable. To avoid ensnaring innocent behavior, contributory
liability regimes often exempt providers of general-purpose components,
equipment, or facilities and impose mental-state standards beyond mere
154. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
155. Amanda Reid, Considering Fair Use: DMCA’s Take Down & Repeat Infringers
Policies, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 101, 105 (2019) (“In this haze, ISPs are incentivized to overblock and err on the side of removing content—including lawful content.”).
156. Grimmelmann, supra note 16 (making a similar point about child pornography as
well).
157. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 155, at 123–24.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
159. The term is sometimes used to refer to both what we call “contributory liability” and
what we call “inducement.” We take our terminology from the patent statute, which
distinguishes them clearly. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2012).
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negligence. Although defamation doctrine does not incorporate a fully
realized version of contributory liability, it similarly provides immunity for
those who merely make “equipment or facilities” available to others for
“general communication purposes.”160
Contributory liability standards vary.
Contributory copyright
infringement, for example, requires proof that the defendant provides a
technology or service that materially contributes to another’s infringement
and is not “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”161 Patent law requires
a showing that the defendant’s technology was “especially made or
especially adapted for [infringing] use.”162
Contributory liability is distinguished from both “monitor and control” and
noticed-based liability in that it does not require secondary parties to do
anything about others’ actionable conduct except to refrain from contributing
to it. The doctrine thus attempts to avoid overenforcement issues.
Depending on the specific standards for actionable contributions and mentalstate requirements that are adopted,163 different contributory liability regimes
may create somewhat different balances between overenforcement and harm
reduction, which reflect different policy trade-offs.
The exemption for general-purpose services has a more universal
justification because imposing liability on such a service in one substantive
arena may create negative externalities in others. For this reason, it is
reasonable to include a general-purpose service exemption in any
contributory liability regime.
3. Inducement Liability
Inducement liability, which is incurred by encouraging others to engage in
actionable conduct, has no analog under traditional defamation doctrine. It
“premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” and
neither “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses”
nor incidental acts “such as offering customers technical support or product
updates” are sufficient.164 Inducement liability is broader than contributory
liability in some respects because it does not require a material contribution
to others’ conduct by the platform.165

160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
161. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
162. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
163. In intellectual property law, for example, there have been longstanding debates about
the contours of the mental state requirements for contributory and inducement liability and
several Supreme Court decisions address the issue. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (patent infringement); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563
U.S. 754 (2011) (patent infringement); MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (copyright infringement). See generally Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement
from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 635 (2008) (situating intellectual property’s
secondary liability doctrines within tort law).
164. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.
165. See id.
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Inducement liability’s focus on the secondary defendant’s own actions and
mental state arguably avoids creating overenforcement incentives. The U.S.
Supreme Court opined that copyright’s inducement liability “does nothing to
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful
promise.”166 That view is probably too rosy. The fuzziness of inducement
liability’s boundaries may create some incentive to avoid gray areas. The
line between inducing actionable and nonactionable behavior (say,
defamation or profane criticism) is not always bright. Proving mental state
Moreover, factfinders might assess the
is notoriously difficult.167
defendant’s own statements and the design of its service through the prism
of its users’ conduct. The extent to which inducement liability will produce
risk-averse behavior by service providers depends on the context, as does the
extent to which society should care.
B. CDA 230 Through a Secondary Liability Lens
CDA 230’s defamation-focused design contained within it the seeds of
problems that have borne unfortunate fruit, especially as smart services have
emerged. Those seeds were of two varieties: first, CDA 230’s drafters did
not anticipate the wide variety of conduct and legal claims it could potentially
immunize; second, CDA 230 adopted defamation doctrine’s all-or-nothing
approach to secondary liability, ignoring the possibility that the socially
preferable secondary enforcement regime might depend on the substantive
context.
1. CDA 230 and Service Provider Conduct
CDA 230 envisions only three roles for online service providers:
publisher168 of third-party information content, information content provider,
and, implicitly, general-purpose facility. Relatedly, CDA 230 reflects an
assumption that actionable content is the only source of liability for publisher
activities.
Online service providers now engage in a broad variety of activities that
CDA 230 was not designed to handle. Automated filtering, sorting, and
prediction have vastly changed the scope of online publishers’ activities,
which can now create or contribute to liability that is not based on actionable
content. CDA 230 holds publishers immune unless they create or develop
actionable content.169 As a result, the statute now often immunizes
publishers from liability for their own directly actionable conduct.

166. Id.
167. See generally Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611
(2011) (discussing some of the complexities involved in proving state of mind).
168. CDA 230’s reference to a “publisher or speaker” is redundant, since a “speaker” of
third-party content is also generally a “publisher.” The inclusion of “speaker” seems to play
no independent role.
169. See, e.g., Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2016); FTC v. LeadClick
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Our ad-targeting case study illustrates this problem. Facebook argues that
it is immune from liability for creating and offering targeting attributes and
for its lookalike audience algorithm essentially because they are publisher
activities that do not contribute to content creation.170 Courts may or may
not reject that argument in favor of a Roommates.com approach. Either
outcome begs the question of why an online service provider’s direct liability
for discriminatory ad targeting should turn on whether the claim treats the
provider as the publisher of another party’s information content.
CDA 230 likely immunizes ad-targeting platforms from the FHA’s
effectively secondary “failure to correct” liability. Whether this particular
form of notice-based liability would impose excessive costs on a smart adtargeting service is a debatable matter of housing discrimination policy.
Whether the targeting platform fits CDA 230’s information content provider
definition seems completely irrelevant to that policy question.
The problem illustrated here is that, even though it seems sensible to
characterize ad targeting as a publisher activity, allegations of discriminatory
ad targeting have nothing to do with content development. CDA 230 was
simply not designed or intended to handle situations in which a service
provider’s activities as a publisher are actionable but the published content is
not.
2. CDA 230’s All-or-Nothing Approach to Secondary Liability
Like defamation doctrine, CDA 230 sets up an all-or-nothing choice
between “monitor and control” liability and complete immunity. Courts have
struggled to find more nuanced ways to apply CDA 230 to today’s
increasingly smart online service providers, but it is a difficult struggle
because the definition of “information content provider” is essentially the
only available statutory hook.
a. Shoehorning in Contributory Liability
Roommates.com essentially shoehorned a contributory liability approach
into the information content provider definition.171 The case interpreted
“responsibility” for developing online information in terms of whether the
website’s design “materially contributed” to its users’ discriminatory
advertising or was a “neutral tool.”172 This test is, of course, familiar from
contributory liability.
While contributory liability may often be a good approach to online service
provider liability, CDA 230’s “information content provider” definition is an
awkward place to insert it. The awkwardness derives not only from the fact
that the definition focuses on content but also from its statutory role in
defining when defendants are directly liable. Contributory liability standards
170. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 24–25.
171. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
172. Id.
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tend to be different from the underlying direct liability standards precisely
because the defendant’s liability is derivative. A contributory liability
analysis is thus a muddled way to decide whether to immunize a defendant
from direct liability.
Moreover, the externality-based rationale for immunizing general-purpose
services (“neutral tools”) from contributory liability does not apply to direct
liability stemming from actionable use of such tools. For direct liability
based on an online service’s design, however, it makes sense to provide
immunity for general-purpose services that could not reasonably be
redesigned to avoid direct liability without sacrificing substantial legitimate
uses.
The ad-targeting case study is again illustrative. The FHA imposes direct
liability when a defendant’s own conduct results in a discriminatory housing
practice, as evaluated under the applicable standards. Those standards
incorporate their own, quite rigorous, tests for distinguishing legitimate
activities from actionable discrimination. Those tests may not align with a
“neutral tool” exemption. For example, proffering a “legitimate reason” for
disparate impact requires more than mere neutrality. Facebook argues that
its attribute-based targeting tool is “neutral” because it offers the same
attributes to all potential advertisers.173 Such neutrality need not imply that
an ad-targeting service has a legitimate reason for offering protected
attributes to housing advertisers. It may simply mean that the service’s
designers did not bother to account for antidiscrimination laws. Immunizing
an ad-targeting service from FHA liability simply because it is “neutral”
seems perverse, particularly if the design could have accounted for
antidiscrimination laws while maintaining the service’s viability for other
sorts of advertisers. The earlier discussion, along with the consent decree,
suggests that this was the case for Facebook.
b. Putting Inducement Back on the Table
Courts have considered inducement-like arguments against CDA 230
immunity but mostly have not been persuaded by them.174 This is probably
the right result under the current statute, despite the fact that the wrongs
alleged in some cases clearly arise from the service provider’s inducement of
actionable conduct by its users. Inducement liability is not appropriate in all
arenas because it can induce some overcompliance, but that is no reason to
insist on CDA 230’s all-or-nothing Hobson’s choice. How worried do we
really need to be about overdeterring service providers from bellying right
up to the line of actively inducing housing discrimination or fraud or child
sex trafficking? Within the strictures of the First Amendment, those tradeoffs are matters for political debate. By enacting FOSTA, which creates
inducement liability, Congress answered that question for prostitution and

173. Facebook Brief, supra note 113, at 27, 30.
174. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
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sex trafficking. FOSTA is controversial,175 but that makes our point. The
adoption of inducement liability in particular substantive arenas should be on
the table for debate.
c. Institutional Competence
Many substantive liability regimes incorporate secondary liability
standards (whether or not so-named) that are much more nuanced than CDA
230’s all-or-nothing approach. Regardless of whether one agrees with the
results, those regimes presumably reflect balances worked out in light of
policy concerns salient in those arenas. CDA 230 runs roughshod over those
balances whenever online service providers are involved. It is still true that
balances struck for offline secondary liability may be upset online and also
that externality concerns may be more urgent simply because generalpurpose services may be more common. Nonetheless, today’s online
services are sufficiently various that it is no longer plausible, particularly
given the rise of smart services, that CDA 230’s all-or-nothing balance is
appropriate for all of them.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we offer a proposal for reform of CDA 230 based on the
above analysis.
1) Definition of “treated as a publisher.” CDA 230 should be amended
to clarify that a party is not “treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider” unless
liability is premised primarily on the actionable nature of that third-party
content. This change preserves the sort of immunity from publisher liability
that the drafters of CDA 230 had in mind.176 We also recommend that the
phrase “publisher or speaker” be modified to “publisher or distributor,”
adopting current judicial interpretation.
2) Limited immunity for services capable of substantial nonactionable
uses. The previous amendment would clarify that online service providers
are generally liable for direct and secondary claims not primarily premised
on actionable third-party content. It is generally appropriate to defer to the
substantive policy trade-offs made by legislators and relevant agencies. We
see no justification, particularly in an era of smart services, for a blanket
assumption that conforming to substantive legal constraints will always be
unduly burdensome for online service providers.
We recognize, however, that some substantive laws and regulations on the
books will not adequately account for the potential external social costs of
holding providers of general-purpose online services liable. We therefore
175. See, e.g., Lura Chamberlain, Note, FOSTA: A Hostile Law with a Human Cost, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2171, 2188–89 (2019) (“Opponents contend that FOSTA could reach any
UISP shown to have hosted actionable material related to sex trafficking even if the UISP had
neither knowledge of the content nor the intent to assist sex traffickers.”).
176. See supra Part I.A.
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propose adding a provision to CDA 230 conferring immunity on providers
of online services capable of substantial nonactionable uses when two
conditions are satisfied: (1) liability is based on the design of the service;
and (2) the service cannot reasonably be designed to avoid liability while
retaining substantial nonactionable uses. The second condition reflects the
fact that software-based services can often be relatively cheaply and easily
customized for different applications. It is also good policy to incentivize
service providers to incorporate such reasonable measures into their designs.
We would apply the proposed limited immunity to both direct and secondary
liability.
The Roommates.com and ad-targeting cases can be used to illustrate how
this proposal would work in practice. Roommates.com’s design may or may
not have had substantial nonactionable uses but, in any event, could easily
have been modified to avoid liability under the FHA simply by removing
protected characteristics.177 The designers were at best reckless with regard
to the site’s potential to promote housing discrimination and there seems to
be no normative justification for immunizing them from liability for their
design. While the Ninth Circuit arrived at the right result, our proposal would
provide a much cleaner path to that outcome.
Facebook’s ad platform is certainly capable of substantial nonactionable
uses, but reasonable design changes along the lines of those in the consent
decree would likely have enabled Facebook to reduce its potential liability
for discriminatory ad targeting without impacting the platform’s
nonactionable uses.
3) Immunity from secondary liability not based on publishing actionable
third-party content.178 We do not propose complete immunity from all
substantive secondary liability provisions. Especially in the era of smart
services, online service providers may have the capacity to cope with many
secondary liability regimes, even if they take “monitor and control” or noticebased approaches. Deference to the policy trade-offs enshrined in
substantive secondary liability regimes is generally appropriate, but many
laws on the books may not have considered how the online environment
might affect those policies. We therefore propose modifying CDA 230 as
follows:
a) Secondary liability provisions based on a defendant’s contribution to,
facilitation of, or failure to monitor actionable user behavior would be
preempted and replaced by a contributory liability regime that combines a
“material contribution” requirement with a “knew or should have known”
mental state, unless and until regulators redesigned or reaffirmed them for
online services. This default contributory liability regime would, for
example, replace substantive “monitor and control” regimes such as the
FHA’s “failure to correct” provisions that had not been redesigned or
reaffirmed.
177. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68.
178. This provision applies even if it is framed as “direct liability,” such as the liability for
“failure to correct” under 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(ii)–(iii).
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b) Online service providers would be immune from substantive
inducement liability regimes, unless and until regulators redesigned or
reaffirmed their applicability. While our proposal puts inducement
liability back on the table, we do not think inducement liability is an
appropriate default, given the First Amendment and collateral censorship
concerns.
c) These rules would apply to both federal and state statutes and
regulations.
As an example, an ad-targeting platform would be immune from liability
under the FHA’s current “failure to correct” provisions because they are not
specifically applicable to online service providers. The service provider
would nonetheless be liable under the default contributory liability regime if
it knew or should have known that its ad-targeting platform materially
contributes to discriminatory ad targeting. In the future, HUD could use
notice-and-comment rulemaking to specifically extend the “failure to
correct” regime to online service providers. Moreover, our proposed version
of CDA 230 would not immunize online service providers from liability if
Congress were to, if it so desired, add a provision to the FHA providing
liability for actively inducing discriminatory uses of automated ad-targeting
tools.

